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THE IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ON
OIL AND GAS LEASES*
I. Introduction.
A. Scope of Outline.
The Uniform Commercial Code (the "U.C.C.)** consists of 
hundreds of statements of contract law rules and has been adopted 
in 49 of 50 states. In terms of America's common law, as 
inherited from England, the U.C.C. is a relative newcomer, first 
being endorsed by the American Bar Association in 1962, with 
major revisions in 1972. After its endorsement, states rapidly 
jumped on board to promote commercial uniformity throughout 
America. As a result of its newness, however, the U.C.C.'s 
impact on more traditional oil and gas law has been limited. But 
in the future this pattern may change as courts become more 
willing to impose the U.C.C. either directly or by analogy into 
areas traditionally governed by common law rules, a trend which 
has occurred in other areas. See e.g. Murray, "Under the 
Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code", 
39 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1971). This trend is likely to continue, 
since the U.C.C. is generally considered the most comprehensive 
and complete legislative statement of modern contract rules and 
principles.
Of the 11 adopted and 2 proposed U.C.C. articles, Article 2, 
dealing with sale transactions, and Article 9, dealing with 
collateral assignments, are the most likely to affect oil and gas 
leases. Other articles, however, may peripherally relate to oil
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**Unless otherwise stated, the section citations throughout this 
outline are to the 1972 version of the Uniform Commercial Code as 
published in selected commercial statutes (West 1987). Arkansas, 
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and gas transactions. For example, Article 3 (Commercial Paper) 
governs many aspects of mineral lease drafts. To narrow this 
outline's scope to manageable size, however, it generally is 
limited to the impact of Articles 2 and 9 on oil and gas leases, 
without considering the influence of other U.C.C. provisions. 
Because many readers are from or have dealings in Arkansas, 
Oklahoma and Texas, where possible this outline also concentrates 
on the law of those states.
B. General Scope of U.C.C. Articles 2 and 9 and Oil and 
Gas Transactions.
To understand the U.C.C.'s impact on oil and gas leases it
is first necessary to review the scope of Articles 2 and 9 and
how they may relate to oil and gas transactions. As a general
rule Articles 2 and 9 only apply to agreements involving personal
property. Thus, whether oil and gas interests are classified as
real estate or personalty under state law is critical in
determining the applicability of the U.C.C. As anyone familiar
with oil and gas law knows, however, courts have classified oil
and gas interests in many different ways. For example one
commentator has listed the following classifications of oil and
gas leasehold interests in different jurisdictions:
"a profit a pendre, a corporeal hereditament, an
incorporeal hereditament, an estate in land, not an 
estate in land, an estate in oil and gas, not an estate 
in oil and gas, a servitude, a chattel real, real 
estate, interest in land, not an interest in land, 
personal property, a free hold, a tenancy at will, 
property interest and the relation of landlord and 
tenant." 1A Sommers, "Oil and Gas", §152 at 371.
Traditional common law distinctions between real and personal 
property have been of limited use in classifying oil and gas
interests, except by analogy. Courts struggling with the unique 
nature of oil and gas interests have compared them to wild 
animals, timber and crops. Hemingway, "Oil and Gas Law", §1.3 
(1971 Ed.). Yet, such distinction is vital to determining 
whether the U.C.C. applies to a particular transaction.
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1. Article 2. §2-102 states that Article 2 "applies
to transactions in goods." The term "transactions" is nowhere 
defined by the U.C.C. but is broader than just sale contracts. 
Hertz Commercial Leasing Corp. v. Transportation Credit Clearing 
House, 6 UCC Rep. 132, 136, 59 Misc. 2d 226, 298 N.Y.S.2d 392
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1969) ("clearly a 'transaction' encompasses a far 
wider area of activity than a 'sale', and it cannot be assumed 
that the word was carelessly chosen.") See also Owens v. Patent 
Scaffolding Co., 77 Misc. 2d 992, 354 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1974); Burton
v. Arterey Co., 279 Md. 94, 367 A.2d 935 (1977); and May Co. v.
Trusnik, 54 Ohio App.2d 71, 375 N.E.2d 72 (1977). Nor does
Article 2 expressly limit this scope, except to state that
Article 2 does not (a) apply to contracts which are intended to 
operate as security transactions [§9-102(1)] or (b) "impair or 
repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or
other specified classes of buyers." §2-102 and Comment. With 
such a broad mandate, it is not surprising that as they become 
familiar with the U.C.C., courts are prepared to apply Article 2 
to many types of commercial problems, including those involving 
oil and gas interests. The question for Article 2 is under what 
circumstances can oil and gas interests be deemed to be "goods".
2. Article 9. Article 9 applies "To any transaction
(regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures . . ." Unlike Article 
2, Article 9 deals with all types of personal property, not just
goods, but limits the type of transactions covered to those
involving security interests. However, Article 9 generally makes 
it clear that the law of real estate mortgages should govern
interests in oil and gas prior to extraction. The original 1962 
U.C.C. version expressly stated that an Article 9 security 
interest cannot attach "in oil, gas or minerals until they are 
extracted." §9-204(2) (1962 version). Under the 1972 version of
the U.C.C. this language was deleted, but §9-105(1)(h) now states 
that Article 9's definition of "goods" does not include "minerals 
or the like (including oil and gas) before extraction." The
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reader should note that Article 2 and Article 9 define "goods" 
differently and the fact that unextracted oil and gas are not 
Article 9 goods does not mean they are not Article 9 personalty. 
However, in addition to §9-105(1) (h) , §9-104(J) expressly
excludes from Article 9's scope "the creation or transfer of an 
interest in or a lien on real estate, including a lease or rents 
thereunder." Presumably the term "lease" is broad enough to 
include oil and gas leases. This analysis suggests that Article 
9 does not cover oil and gas until they are extracted. But as 
will be seen, such a conclusion may be an oversimplification 
which can mislead the unwary.
3. Article 2A Leases. Subject to editorial revision, 
the National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
and the American Law Institute have issued a proposed final draft 
of U.C.C. Article 2A which deals with leases. Article 2A 
provides numerous commercial rules for lease transactions which 
in many ways parallel Articles 2's rules for sales. The question 
of whether Article 2A covers oil and gas leases is expressly 
answered. If adopted Article 2A "applies to any transaction,
regardless of form, that creates a lease." As noted in the 
Article 9 discussion, the term "lease" generally is broad enough 
to reach oil and gas leases. But Article 2A's definition is 
narrower defining "lease" to be "a transfer of the right to 
possession and use of goods. . . ." §2A-103(j). "Goods" means
"all things that are moveable at the time of identification to 
the lease contract, or are fixtures..., but the term does not 
include. . . . minerals or the like, including oil and gas, 
before extraction. . . ." §2A-103(h) (emphasis added). Thus,
Article 2A on leases, clearly does not cover oil and gas or oil 
and gas leases before extraction.
C. The Nature of Oil and Gas Ownership Before Extraction 
Under State Law.
Based on this brief review of Articles 2, 2A and 9, it is 
important in defining the relationship between the U.C.C. and oil
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and gas interests to first determine whether applicable state law 
classifies oil and gas interests before extraction as personal or 
real property. As previously suggested, this is not a 
straightforward inquiry. Because of the special nature of oil 
and gas, it is difficult to describe the rights of an oil and gas 
owner in conventional property terms and special rules have 
arisen reflecting this uniqueness. Eugene Kuntz in his "Treatise 
on the Law of Oil and Gas" Vols. 1-7 (1987 ed.) (herein "Kuntz") 
observes however, that all of the various theories of oil and gas 
ownership fall into one of two categories: (1) "ownership-in- 
place" or (2) "exclusive-right-to-take." Kuntz §2.4. Under 
ownership-in-place a landowner owns all oil and gas underlying 
his property, only subject to the law of capture. Under 
exclusive-right-to-take, oil and gas is the object of absolute 
ownership only after it is captured. Before capture the 
landowner only has an exclusive right to capture the oil and gas 
by drilling operations on his land.
As Kuntz notes, these ownership classifications are 
generally "of questionable utility and opinions may reasonably 
differ. . . . "  Kuntz §2.4. Yet, they have influenced decisions 
relating to partition, remedies available for protection of 
ownership, measures of damages, recording statutes, ad valorem 
taxes and numerous other issues. They may also provide guidance 
as to how courts will treat oil and gas transactions under the 
U.C.C. Before considering U.C.C. applicability further, 
following is a summary of the ownership theories adopted by 
Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas and their affect on the 
classification of oil and gas leases as personal or real 
property.
1. Arkansas. Generally, Arkansas is regarded as an 
"ownership-in-place state." Kuntz, §23.5 Bobcaw Lbr. Co. v. 
Goode, 160 Ark. 48, 254 S.W. 345 (1923) c.f. Osborn v. Arkansas 
Terr. Oil & Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.W. 122 (1912) (appearing to 
adopt a nonownership theory). Notwithstanding this theory, 
Arkansas treats all oil and gas leases as conveying an interest
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and easement in the land itself. Ownership of the underlying oil 
and gas does not pass until capture. Pasteur v. Niswanger, 226 
Ark. 486, 270 S.W.2d 852 (1956). Thus, it has been said that 
under Arkansas law an oil and gas lease creates an interest 
which "is more than a mere license but represents an easement in 
the land itself." Kuntz §23.5. Based on this theory the 
Arkansas Supreme Court has held for example that:
a. Recording. Oil and gas leases and 
assignments of oil and gas leases are subject to real property 
recording statutes. Wasp Oil, Inc. v. Arkansas Oil & Gas, Inc., 
658 S.W.2d 397 (Ark. 1983).
b. Venue. An oil and gas lease creates a 
separate interest in land for the purpose of venue. Clark v. 
Dennis, 172 Ark. 1096, 291 S.W. 807 (1927).
c. M & M Liens. Leases, royalties and leasehold 
interests are subject to materialmens' and mechanics' lien 
statutes. Roberts v. Tice, 198 Ark. 397, 129 S.W.2d 258 (1939).
2. Oklahoma. Notwithstanding inconsistent language 
in Oklahoma Supreme Court cases, it is generally agreed that 
Oklahoma has adopted an exclusive-right-to-take theory. Kuntz, 
§23.23; and Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 172 P. 86 (1918)
c. f. law review articles at 31 Calif. L. Rev. 357, 13 Miss. L.J. 
353 13 Tex. L. Rev. 391 and Sullivan, "Handbook of Oil and Gas 
Law." Thus, a lessee cannot acquire an interest or estate in the 
subject land, but instead gets a chattel real, profit-a-pendre or 
an incorporeal hereditament. Rich v. Doneghey, supra and Hinds 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979) Casper v. 
Neubert, 489 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1973); and Continental Supply 
Co. v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945). A lease gives 
the grantee an interest which is an estate in land, but is not 
"real estate" within the meaning of certain Oklahoma statutes. 
In Cate v. Arclon Oil Company, Inc., 695 P.2d 1352 (Okla. 1985) 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed "that although an oil and gas 
lease creates an interest or estate in realty, the interest is
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In accord Shields v. Moffitt, 683 P.2dnot per se real estate."
530 (Okla. 1984) ; Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., supra; and De 
Mik v. Cargill, 185 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1971). See also §9-104
(excluding interests or lien on "real estate"). This hybrid 
characterization sometimes makes Oklahoma's law on the question 
of whether or not an oil and gas lease is personal property very 
unclear to both novices and part-time oil and gas practitioners. 
But generally, an oil and gas lease in Oklahoma is treated as
real property rather than personal property. For example the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held;
a. Statute of Frauds. Oil and gas leases and
assignments must comply with Oklahoma's non-U.C.C. statute of 
frauds. Woodworth v. Franklin, 85 Okla. 27, 204 P. 452 (1921)
(lease) and David v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 91, 100 P.2d 994 (1940) 
(assignment) .
b. Execution Formalities. Oil and gas leases 
must be executed in the same manner as deeds and other 
instruments affecting real estate. Bentley v. Zelma Oil Co., 87 
Okla. 116, 184 P. 131 (1919); Carroll v. Holliman, 336 F.2d 425 
(10th Cir. 1964); Bush v. U.S. Steel Corp. 227 F.Supp. 602 (E.D. 
Okla. 1965); and 16 Okla. Stat. §15, and 12A Okla. Stat. §2- 
107(3).
c. Recording. To be effective against third
parties, a lease, assignment or mortgage of a lease must be 
properly acknowledged and recorded. Davis v. Lewis, 187 Okla. 
91, 100 P.2d 994 (1940) (assignment); Continental Supp. Co. v.
Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945) (mortgage); and Carroll
v. Holliman, 336 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1964).
d. Homestead. An oil and gas lease of a 
homestead requires the joint consent of husband and wife. Carter 
Oil Co. v. Popp, 70 Okla. 232, 174 P. 747 (1918).
e. Quiet Title. An oil and gas lessee who is
not in possession can maintain a quiet title action. Franklin v. 
Margay Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944).
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f. Implied Warranty. Implied warranty for sale 
of goods (pre-U.C.C.) does not apply to an oil and gas lease. 
Tupecer v. Deaner, 46 Okla. 328, 148 P. 853 (1915).
g. No Judgment Lien. An oil and gas lease is 
not "real estate" within meaning of judgment lien statute. First 
Nat. Bank of Healdton v. Dunlap, 122 Okla. 288, 254 P.729 (1927) 
and Hinds v. Phillips, supra.
h. Partition. An oil and gas lease is not "real 
property" within the meaning of statutes governing partition. 
Clark v. Mercer Oil Co., 139 Okla. 48, 281 P. 283 (1929).
i. Venue. An oil and gas lease is not "real 
property" within the meaning of venue statute requiring 
foreclosure actions to be brought in the county where the 
property is located. Widick v. Phillips Pet. Co., 173 Okla. 
325, 49 P .2d 132 (1935) .
j. Ad Valorem Taxes. An oil and gas lease is 
not subject to ad valorem taxes. See State v. Shamblin, 185 
Okla. 126, 90 P.2d 1053 (1939).
k. Mortgage Recording Tax. Oklahoma's real 
estate mortgage tax is not payable on a mortgage of (1) "oil, gas 
and other minerals." Okla. A. G. Op. 65-117, or (2) oil and gas 
lease. Okla. A. G. Op. dated 8/24/56; but it is payable in case 
a "hard" mineral is specified in the collateral description (e.g. 
a mortgage on oil, gas, coal, bauxite and other minerals). See 
Okla. A. G. Op. 65-117.
3. Texas. Texas has adopted the ownership-in-place 
theory. Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d 
558 (1948) . Thus, Texas courts generally have held that an oil 
and gas lease "constitutes a conveyance of a determinable fee in 
the minerals" and is generally considered as an interest in real 
estate. Kuntz §23.26; Will Cockson v. Colorado River Municipal 
Water Dist., 426 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Cherokee 
Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. 1982); Bil Lake
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Oil Co. v. Reagan County, 217 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); 
and Sheppard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 125 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1939). Thus, unlike Oklahoma, a lessee's interest in 
oil and gas is real property for all of the following purposes:
a. Statute of Frauds. Stekoll Pet. Co. v. 
Hamilton, 255 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. 1953).
b. Recording. Witherspoon v. Green, 274 S.W. 
170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
c. Community/Separate Property. Norris v.
Vaughan, 491 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1953).
d. Venue. Marshall v. McMurrey, 303 S.W.2d 811 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
e. M & M Liens. Carroll v. McCarthy, 129 S.W.2d 
1201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
f. Attachment and Execution. Humble Oil & Ref. 
Co. v. Andrews, 285 S.W. 894 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
g. Ad Valorem Taxes. Carroll v. Holliman, 336
F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1964) (This case provides a good comparison
between the Oklahoma and Texas approaches to classification.)
D . Classification of Other Oil and Gas Interests.
Many other oil and gas interests flow from oil and gas 
leases. These include royalty interests, working interests,
overriding royalty interests, production payments and net profits 
interests. Because oil and gas leases are generally treated as 
interests in real property (as in Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas) 
most courts treat these derivative interests the same way. Smith 
v. Smith, 60 N.W.2d 276 (W.D. 1953) and Bolack v. Hedies, 240
P.2d 844 (N.M. 1952). For example, in Oklahoma unaccrued
royalties due under an oil and gas lease are real property for 
the purposes of a lessor's estate. McCully v. McCully, 86 P.2d 
786 (Okla. 1939); and Cuff v. Koslosky, 25 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1933). 
Similarly, royalties are real property under an appraisement
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statute. Cuff v. Koslosky, supra. Overriding royalty interests 
in future production are also an interest in real property. 
Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Co., 308 F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962); and 
Danciger Oil and Refinery Co. v. Burroughs, 75 F.2d 855 (10th 
Cir.); cert. den. 195 M.S. 79 (1935). These decisions are a 
straightforward analysis based on the relationship of these 
derivative interests to oil and gas leases. However, two of 
these interests should be considered in greater detail because by 
their very nature they are more removed from oil and gas leases. 
As Kuntz recognizes, mineral estate owners may grant or reserve 
rights that "do not constitute estates or interests in 
land. . . ." Kuntz. §15.2. For example he notes that the grant 
of a "privilege to drill an oil well" is not a transfer of an 
interest in real property. Id. See also Collier v. Caraway, 140 
S.W. 2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
1. Production Payment. At its simplest, a production 
payment owner has nothing more than a contract right to payment. 
As one commentator has suggested it could be argued that this 
right is an Article 9 general intangible or account receivable 
rather than real property. Ryan, "Effect of the Uniform 
Commercial Code on Oil and Gas Transactions", 18th Annual Inst. 
on Oil and Gas Law and Taxation, 365, 416-422 (1965) . Barkley 
Clark in his Article 9 treatise, however, suggests that treating 
a production payment as an Article 9 interest creates unnecessary 
confusion. See B. Clark, "The Law of Secured Transactions", 
§13.2(3) ("B. Clark"). In Davis v. Lewis, 100 P.2d 944 (Okla. 
1940), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that an assignment of 
production payments also constituted a contract relating to real 
estate under the Oklahoma recording statutes. Notwithstanding 
this classification, Kuntz notes that production payments can be 
classified as either royalties or excess (bonus) royalties under 
oil and gas law. Kuntz, §15.1, P. 432. Different treatment can 
result from this dichotomy. For example in American Oil & 
Refining Co. v. Cornish, 49 P.2d 81 (Okla. 1935) the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court found that a production payment was not "property"
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for the purposes of a constitutional property tax exemption. No 
definitive classification cases involving production payments for 
Article 9 purposes have been found by this author.
2. Net Profits Interest. There is dicta suggesting 
that net profits interests are merely contract rights. Le Bus v. 
Le Bus, 269 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). There is also 
authority that they are real property. Greenleaf v. S.A. Camp 
Ginning Co., 309 P.2d 943 (Cal. App. 1954). Commentators have 
suggested that this latter interpretation is the better rule, 
because both production payments and net profits interests arise 
out of the fractional ownership of unextracted oil and gas 
interests. 2 Williams & Meyers, "Oil and Gas Law" § 424.1 (1964 
ed.) and B. Clark §13.2(4).
E . Classification of Extracted Oil and Gas.
Kuntz states that "although there are differing views 
regarding the character of ownership of oil and gas as they 
reside in the earth, there is uniformity in the conclusion that 
once oil and gas is extracted from the earth, it becomes tangible 
personal property...." Kuntz, §2.5. Shreveport - El Dorado Pipe 
Line Co. v. Bennett, 290 S.W. 929 (Ark. 1927); Carpenter v. 
Shaw, 272 P. 393 (Okla. 1928) and Continental Supply Co. v. 
Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945); and Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Mecom, 375 S.W. 2d 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). For the 
purposes of Article 9, extracted oil and gas may be either 
inventory or accounts.
F . Types of Oil and Gas Contracts which may be Impacted by 
the U.C.C.
Numerous types of contractual arrangements can be made in 
connection with oil and gas transactions. These include options 
to purchase mineral or leasehold interests, contracts for the 
transfer of interests in oil and gas, contracts for the future 
execution of a lease, leases, operating agreements, service 
contracts, licenses, long term gas and/or oil purchase/sale
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contracts, spot market purchase/sale contracts, mortgages of oil 
and gas interests, and collateral and other assignments of 
interests. Article 9 affects mortgages, collateral assignments 
and other agreements (e.g. operating agreement provision 
granting a lien on a signatory's oil and gas interests)
purporting to create security interests.
Although Article 2's impact may be greater on oil and gas 
law, this outline only considers the applicability of Article 2 
to (1) oil and gas leases and (2) oil and gas purchase/sale 
contracts. To do otherwise may leave the reader wondering "will 
it end." In any event, this applicability analysis is the same 
for other types of oil and gas agreements.
II. Applicability of Article 2 to Oil and Gas Leases and
Purchase/Sale Contracts.
In considering whether Article 2 applies to oil and gas 
leases and purchase/sale contracts, the question is whether such 
agreements cover "transactions in goods." §2-102.
A. Oil and Gas Leases as Transactions In Goods.
Before beginning this discussion, the author cautions that 
almost no case law deals directly with this issue. Following are 
the few reported cases which have considered whether oil and gas 
leases are covered by Article 2.
1. After Extraction. Extracted oil and gas are
"goods" within the meaning of Article 2. §2-105. Amoco Pipeline
Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Co., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974)
(Oil) and cases annotated in 4 ALR 4th 912 (1981 ed.). The real
question is whether oil and gas are goods before extraction.
2. Cases Dealing with Oil and Gas Leases as 
Transactions In Goods Prior to Extraction.
a. Leases Are Not Transactions In Goods. In 
Casper v. Neubert, 489 F.2d 543 (10th Cir. 1973) (appealed from 
W.D. Okla.) the owner of undivided interests in several oil and 
gas leases sold his rights to a third party who subsequently
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defaulted in payment. The trial court denied the owner's claim 
for a vendor's lien in favor of "one who sells real property" (42 
Okla. Stat. §26) holding that oil and gas leases are not "real 
property" within the meaning of Oklahoma's vendor lien statute. 
Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
the vendor lien statute did apply to the sale of oil and gas 
leases. In part, this conclusion was based on Oklahoma's concept 
of an oil and gas lease as an interest in land. But the court 
went further, relying on §2-105(7) and §2-107(1) to find that 
unextracted oil and gas were not goods and that Article 2's 
vendor lien thus did not apply. Since the U.C.C. 's vendor lien 
did not apply, the court reasoned that the real property lien 
must apply, almost by default. Neubert is generally cited for 
the proposition that an oil and gas lease is not a transaction in 
goods within the meaning of Article 2. This general rule,
however, is too broad. Neubert actually addresses the question 
of whether or not the sale of an oil and gas lease is an Article 
2 transaction in goods, not whether or not an oil and gas lease 
is a transaction in goods.
In Comptroller of the Treasury v. Shell, 64 
Md. App. 252, 500 A.2d 315 (1985), the Maryland Court of Appeals 
considered the classification of oil and gas leases in connection 
with a corporate income tax dispute between Shell and Maryland. 
Finding that royalties paid under oil and gas leases were "gross 
rent" for the purposes of deductions taken by Shell against its 
taxable income, the Maryland Appeals Court cited the following 
cases for the proposition that oil and gas leases are not 
transactions in goods:
(1) Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932)
Deciding whether lease bonus and royalty payments 
were ordinary income or capital gain the United 
States Supreme Court stated: "Leases would not
generally be described as a 'sale' of the mineral 
content of the soil. . . nor would the payments 
made by lessee to lessor generally be denominated 
the purchase price of the oil and gas."
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(2) Kiser v. Eberly, 88 A.2d 242 (1952): 
"Notwithstanding considerable real or apparent 
conflict in the decisions as to the nature of [the 
substantive] rights [that pass under an oil and 
gas lease] all of the cases . . . hold that an oil 
and gas lease conveys an interest in or concerning 
land." Id. at 246.
b. Oil and Gas Leases Are Analogous to Article 2 
Transactions in Goods. The concurring opinion in McGinnis v. 
Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765 (W. Va. 1984) reaches the broad conclusion 
that the U.C.C. might apply by analogy to oil and gas leases. 
The case considered an 1893 oil lease which provided $100 per 
year to lessor for all gas production but a l/8th royalty on oil 
production. Following a deepening of the original well,
significant amounts of gas were collected. The lessor brought an 
action to reform the lease’s gas payment provision to reflect a 
l/8th royalty. Reversing the trial court’s denial of
reformation, the West Virginia Supreme Court held that under 
certain circumstances reformation might be appropriate. In a 
concurring opinion, J. Harshbarger argued that broad U.C.C. 
remedial rights were available to the lessor:
"Gas and oil contracts are construed and interpreted by 
courts in the same general manner as other contracts.
One would be blind to pretend that they are anything 
but business contracts that tangentially involve 
aspects of real property law. They are closer to
contracts for the sale of goods than typical property 
leases." Id. at 772.
The United States Court of Appeals, Fifth
Circuit imposed Article 2 rules dealing with passage of title 
(§2-401[l]), quantity (§2—105 [4]) and contract quality 
specifications (§2-501[1]) in Piney Woods Country Life School v. 
Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 231-32 (5th Cir. 1984) when 
interpreting the relationship between lease royalty clauses and a 
gas purchase contract. Although this case is not directly on 
point, the Court clearly interpreted the lease royalty clause
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using U.C.C. concepts. This result followed because the gas
purchase contract and lease royalty clause were so intertwined.
2. Are Unextracted Oil and Gas "Goods" under 
Article 2. Assuming a lease is most probably an Article 2
"transaction", C.f. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 1-3 (1932), the 
question is whether unextracted oil and gas are "goods" within 
the meaning of Article 2. As suggested by Neubert, this issue is 
controlled by §§2-105(1) and 2-107(1).
a. §2-105 (1). §2-105(1) defines goods as
follows:
"Goods" means all things (including specially
manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time of 
identification to the contract for sale . . . "Goods" 
also includes . . . other identified things attached to 
realty as described in the section on goods to be 
severed from realty (§2-107).
Based on this emphasized language, Comment 1 to §2-105(1) 
recognizes that §2-107 controls "contracts to
sell . . . minerals . . .  to be removed from the land. . . . " 
Before considering §2-107(1), however, it is important to first 
note that §2-105's definition of goods is totally consistent with 
unextracted oil and gas being treated as goods, if the point of 
identification to the contract occurs upon extraction (Note Piney 
Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726 F.2d 225, 234
(5th Cir. 1984) equates identification under §2-105 with bringing 
the oil and gas to the surface): (1) §2-105(2) permits a
"present sale of future goods or any interest;" (2) §2-105(3) 
allows "sale of a part interest in existing identified goods;" 
and (3) §2-105(4) states that an "undivided share in an 
identified bulk . . .  is sufficiently identified to be sold 
although the quantity of the bulk is not determined."
b. §2-107 (1): §2-107(1) expressly deals with
goods to be severed from realty and provides:
A contract for the sale of minerals or the like, 
including oil and gas. . . is a contract for the sale
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of goods within this Article if they are to be severed 
by the seller. . . . "  (emphasis added)
Comment No. 1 to §2-107(1) focuses on the emphasized language 
stating that "If the buyer is to sever, such transactions are
considered contracts affecting land. . . ."To the extent oil and 
gas leases resemble a sale, then the lessee is the "buyer" and, 
as such, it is the lessee or its assign who will most probably 
extract the oil and gas. Thus, the result of Casper v.
Newberry. This analysis does not necessarily mean that Article 2
is inapplicable to oil and gas leases, however. Imaginative 
lawyering may help convince a court to apply Article 2 provisions 
and principles into oil and gas leases.
3. Arguments for Treating Oil and Gas Leases as 
"Transactions in Goods." Before considering these theories, it 
is important to recognize that even if an oil and gas lease is a 
transaction in goods, it is not a "contract for sale." A lessor 
does not sell his goods and lease payments do not resemble sale 
proceeds. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932). Following are
some arguments which parties who want to apply Article 2 to oil
and gas leases might present:
a. Working Interest Held by Lessor. Generally,
lessors do not own working interests in oil and gas leases. 
However, in cases where lessors obtain such interests, then such 
lessors would be responsible for severing oil and gas from the 
realty. As noted, §§2-105(2), (3) and (4) are consistent with
owning a percentage undivided share of the whole amount of goods. 
This is the type of interest held by a working interest owner 
By analogy, a lessor is like a seller and, thus, it can be argued 
that §2-102(1) has also been satisfied. The result being that 
the unextracted oil and gas are goods and the lease, a 
transaction in goods.
b. By Analogy. Cayton suggests that Article 2
be applied to oil and gas leases by analogy. New Article 2A 
codifies this approach for non-oil and gas leases. This approach
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has long been followed by courts in other areas, with its widest 
historic application in equipment lease transactions. KLPR TV, 
Inc. v. Visual Electronics Corp., 465 F.2d 1382 (8th Cir. 1972) 
(applying Arkansas law); John Deere Leasing Co. v. Blubaugh, 636 
F. Supp. 1569 (D. Kan. 1986); Sawyer v. Pioneer Leasing Corp.,
244 Ark. 493, 428 S.W.2d 46 (1968); Pacific American Leasing
Corp. v. S.P.E. Bldg. Systems, Inc., 730 P.2d 273 (Ariz. App. 
1986); and Smith v. Sharpensteen, 13 UCC Rep. 609 (Okla. App. 
1973) rev'd on other grounds 521 P.2d 394 (Okla. 1974). c .f. 
Allen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 387 F. Supp. 364 (S.D.
Tex. 1974) ("it is axiomatic that in order for Article 2. . . to 
apply, it is necessary that a sale. . . form the basis for the 
cause of action.") By similar reasoning, courts have also 
applied portions of Article 2 to franchise and distributor 
agreements, which only peripherally deal with goods. Loos & 
Dilworth v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 500 A.2d 1155 (Pa.
Super. 1985) (applying an obligation of good faith by analogy); 
Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 549 F.2d 129 (5th
Cir. 1979); and Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408
N.E.2d 1370 (1980). In making such an analogy, the courts have
looked to the underlying character of the entire transaction, and 
whether its essence is for the provision of goods from one party 
to another. Sally Beauty Co., Inc. v. Nexxus Products Co., Inc., 
801 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law). No doubt, 
extracted oil and gas are goods under the U.C.C. Thus, oil and 
gas leases are the first agreements in a chain which ultimately 
leads to the sale of the oil and gas goods to third parties. 
Additionally, lessors usually reserve interests in the resulting 
income streams generated by sale of the severed oil and gas. But 
ultimate sale only occurs after exploration, drilling, operating 
agreements and separate sale contracts between working interest 
owners, or their nominees, and purchasers. Because of this 
remoteness, courts should be careful in applying Article 2 by 
analogy. In similar situations courts have recognized important 
limits on reasoning by analogy:
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"Reasoning by analogy does not require us to apply 
Article 2 into a lease; rather we need apply only those 
provisions which are sufficiently analogous." Glenn 
Dick Equipment Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 
216, 541 P.2d 1184 (1975) (equipment lease).
4. Oil and Gas Sale Contracts. Given the previous 
analysis of §§2-102, 2-105(1) and 2-107(1) it is not surprising
that contracts for the sale of extracted oil and gas are 
uniformly held to be contracts for sale under the U.C.C. Amoco 
Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303 (10th Cir.
1985); Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil Co., 726
F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984); Pennzoil Co. v.____Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981); Amoco 
Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th 
Cir. 1974); Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Larry H. Wright, 
Inc., 443 F. Supp. 14 (S.D. Ohio 1977); American Exploration
Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 40 U.C.C. Rep. 1647 
(S.D. Ohio 1985); K.N. Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 
698 P.2d 769 (Colo. 1985); Pioneer Hi Bred Corn Co. of Ill. v.
Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 Ill. App. 3d 638, 306 N.E.2d 337
(1973); and Sunflower Elec. Corp., Inc. v. Tomlinson Oil Co., 
Inc., 638 P. 2d 963 (Kan. App. 1981); and 4 ALR 4th 912 (1981
Ed.). As with oil and gas leases, however, sale/purchase
contracts must provide that the oil and gas be severed by the
seller to meet §2-107(l)'s test. Otherwise, they will be treated
as a sale of real property. In practice, most gas contracts 
provide that the seller will "sell and deliver" the gas to buyer. 
Legg & Dacy, "The Applicability of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
Natural Gas Contracts" 36 Oil and Gas Tax Quarterly Vol. 3, 67
(1987) and Oskey Gasoline and Oil Co. v. OKC Refining, 364 
F .Supp. 1137, 1141 (D. Minn. 1973).
III. Impact of Article 2 on Oil and Gas Leases and Sale/Purchase 
Contracts.
If a contract is directly subject to Article 2, then it is 
subject to all of its rules. If Article 2 is applied by analogy, 
the court may limit its applicability. Again to limit its scope,
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this outline will only consider the possible impact of certain 
sections of Article 2, including (1) formation, (2) inter-
pretation, (3) remedies and (4) certain defenses.
A. Formation. While there are parallels between Article 2 
and common law contract principles, it has been said that Article 
2's "provisions on the formation of contracts for the sale of 
goods have. . . radically altered sales law. . . In most 
fundamental terms (Article 2) expands our conception of contract. 
It makes contracts easier to form and it imposes a wider range of 
obligations than before." White & Summers, "Uniform Commercial 
Code", §1-1 (1980 Ed.). Unlike the common law, Article 2 
presumes that there is a basic disposition towards making 
business arrangements into legally enforceable contracts, even 
through certain elements required by common law are missing. For 
example, §2-204(1) says "a contract, for sale of goods may be 
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including 
conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of such a 
contract." Article 2 goes even farther by providing so-called 
gap-fillers which ensure a basis for finding a contract, which 
might otherwise fail for indefiniteness. Following are some 
examples of these provisions which may have particular 
application to oil and gas related agreements.
1. Indefiniteness. §2-202(1) permits a contract 
"even though one or more terms are left open. . . if the parties 
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably 
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." Thus, a 
contract may be found even though there are "missing terms needed 
for performance, open price, remedies and the like." Comment to 
§2-204.
2. Writing. A contract may be evidenced by any 
writing which is "sufficient to indicate a contract for sale has 
been made." §2-201(1). Consequently, not all terms need be in 
writing.
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3. No Price Term. Parties may intend to be bound by 
an agreement, even though price is not settled. In such cases, 
if (a) nothing is said as to price, or (b) the price is to be 
fixed by the parties and they cannot agree, or (c) the price is 
fixed according to some market or other standard set by a third 
party and it is not so set or recorded then the price is the 
"reasonable price at the time of delivery". The parties may also 
agree that the price be fixed by the buyer or seller in good 
faith. §2-305(1). In North Central Airlines v. Continental Oil 
Co., 547 F.2d 582 (D.C. 1978), the price for aviation fuel was 
fixed at posted prices set by a third party. When that party 
changed the method, the contract no longer set a definite price. 
Relying on §2-305, the Court set the price at a "reasonable" 
level. A similar result may follow with deregulated gas under 
N.G.P.A. because provisions tied to regulated prices will no 
longer be applicable. To the extent a contract price 
redetermination clause does not control, the U.C.C. will set the 
price at a "reasonable" level.
4. Output/Requirements Contracts. §2-306(1) permits 
quantity terms measured by actual output or requirements as they 
may occur in good faith. Since extracted oil and gas are goods 
within the meaning of the U.C.C., any type of arrangement whereby 
a third party is in charge of selling such oil and gas on behalf 
of working interest owners, may be subject to §2-306(2). Such 
relationships often occur under operating agreements. 
Additionally, a gas contract may be viewed as an 
output/requirements contract, which imposes a standard of good 
faith on both parties to the contract.
5. Merchants under the U.C.C. §2-104 defines 
merchant as a "person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise 
by his occupation, holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or good involved in the transaction or 
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent. . . or 
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as
-20-
having such knowledge or skill." §2-104's definition of merchant 
captures a considerably broader class than the man on the street 
might think. The "dealing in goods" requirement includes people 
like the jeweler, hardware store owner, furniture salesmen and 
others selling from inventory while the second, dealing with 
occupation, includes specialties such as electricians, plumbers, 
carpenters, boat builders, landmen and the like. The definition 
of §2-104 is so broad that it is most likely that oil and gas 
companies, pipeline companies, producing companies and the like 
are well within its scope. Even individuals who own a 
significant number of working interests and are involved in the 
sale of the oil and gas attributable to those working interests 
may be merchants. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Larry 
H. Wright, Inc. , 443 F.Supp. 14 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (Applying the
U.C.C. definition of merchant). This classification imposes 
higher standards in contractual relationships. Consider a spot 
market example discussed in a recent article dealing with the 
U.C.C.'s impact on oil and gas law. On the spot market it is not 
unusual for a party to make "brief one paragraph written offers 
to buy or sell gas." Legg & Dacy, "The Applicability of the
Uniform Commercial Code to Natural Gas Contracts", 36 Oil & Gas 
Tax Quarterly Vol. 3, 67, 73 (1987). If the parties are
classified as merchants, it is quite likely that such offers
result in binding contracts as follows:
a. Indefiniteness. As previously noted, a
contract will not fail for indefiniteness despite the fact that 
one or more terms are left open. §§2-202 (1) and 2-204 (3). See 
Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Larry H. Wright, Inc., supra 
and Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 754 F.2d 303 
(10th Cir. 1985) (both applying the U.C.C.'s parole evidence 
rule) .
b. Statute of Frauds. Under the U.C.C., a 
contract for the sale of goods for $500 or more must be evidenced 
by a writing "sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has 
been made between the parties and signed by the party against
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whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent...." §2- 
201(1). However, a different rule applies to merchants. Between 
merchants, a written confirmation of an oral contract satisfies 
this writing requirement unless the other party objects within 10 
days after receipt of the confirmation §2-201(2).
c. Offer and Acceptance. Between merchants, a 
definite expression of acceptance of an offer to sell which is 
sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance of a 
contract, even though it states terms additional to or different 
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly 
made conditional or is sent to the additional or different terms. 
§2-207(2). If additional terms are proposed to a contract 
between merchants, they become part of the contract unless: (i) 
the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; 
(ii) they materially alter the offer; or (iii) notification of 
objection to them has already been given or is given within 
reasonable time after notice of them is received. §2-207. This 
is different from the non-merchant rule and results in easier 
contract formation with the U.C.C. filler terms supplying the 
remainder of the terms.
d. Warranties. The implied warranty of 
merchantability under §2-314 will arise because the seller is a 
merchant. Pioneer Hi Bred Corn Co. of Ill. v. Northern Ill. Gas 
Co. , 16 Ill. App. 3d 638, 306 W.E.2d 332 (1973) (failure to 
maintain a certain gas pressure as a breach of warranty).
e. Good Faith. A merchant's standard of good 
faith under §2-103(1)(b) includes honesty in fact and an 
observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in 
the trade, an objective standard provable by extrinsic evidence. 
Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th 
Cir. 1974) (failure to take gas constituted a breach of good 
faith); and Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Larry H. Wright, 
Inc., supra.
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f. Responsibilities of Merchant Buyers to Follow
Seller Instructions. §2-327(1)(c), §2-603 and §2-605 presents
special responsibilities of merchant buyers to follow seller's 
instructions.
g. Contract Modification. As between merchants, 
a contract which excludes modification or rescission except by 
signed writing, can be satisfied on a form supplied by a merchant 
simply signed by the other party.
When taken together with the price and quantity fillers of 
§2-305 and §2-306, these sections mean that parties dealing in 
the spot market must be wary when dealing in confirmations, 
proposals and counterproposals lest they find themselves having 
made a binding contract.
B. Interpretation. Most courts generally state that the
paramount issue in contract interpretation is determining the 
party's intent at the time of making the contract. Penzoil v. 
F.E.R.C., 645 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1981); and Oskey Gasoline & Oil 
Co. v. OKC Refining, Inc., 364 F.Supp. 1137 (D.C. Minn. 1973).
Under the common law and many state statutes, the parole evidence 
rule and statute of frauds generally require that writings be 
treated as a complete expression of an agreement and do not 
permit extrinsic evidence to explain the terms. The U.C.C.
restricts this rule and comes closer to assuming that a writing 
is not a complete expression of the agreements between the 
parties, even if there is no ambiguity. Thus §2-202 provides 
that, although the final terms of an agreement may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporary oral agreement, they may be explained or
supplemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, course of 
performance and even evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been intended as a
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. 
This is true even where the contract is not ambiguous. Paragon 
Resources v. Natural Fuel Gas Dist., 695 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.
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1983). Nonwritten course of dealing, usage of trade and course 
of performance may be very critical in interpreting oil or gas 
sale/purchase contracts.
1. Course of Dealing. A course of dealing "is a 
sequence of previous conduct between the parties. . . which is 
fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of 
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other 
conduct." (emphasis added) §1-205(1). A course of dealing 
arises prior to the contract and can be used to supplement an 
agreement even where there is no ambiguity. The express terms of 
the agreement and an applicable course of dealing should be 
construed as being consistent with each other when possible, "but 
when such construction is unreasonable, express terms control 
both course of dealing and usage of trade and course of dealing 
controls usage of trade." §1-205(4). Course of dealing can be 
critical because it has been said that prior dealings are the 
"best possible guide" to the parties true intent with regard to 
the contract. K.N. Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., 698 
P.2d 769 (Col. 1985) and Amoco Production Co. v. Western Slope 
Gas Co., 754 F .2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985).
2. Trade Usage. "A usage of Trade is any practice or 
method of dealing having such regularity of observance at a 
place, vocational or trade as to justify an expectation that it 
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question." 
§1-205(2). Like course of dealing, trade usage arises before the 
contract and is a question of fact. §1-205(2).
3. Course of Performance. Unlike (1) and (2) above
"course of performance" is based on relevant conduct following 
execution of the contract. It has been noted that "the U.C.C. 
looks to the actual performance of a contract as the best
indication of what the parties intended these terms to mean.
Course of performance. . . aids interpretation whenever one party
accepts repeated performance by the other party with knowledge of 
the nature of performance and an opportunity to object to it, but
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acquiesces or does not object." Paragon Resources v. Natural 
Fuel Gas Dist., 695 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1983) and K.N. Energy,
Inc. v. Great Western Sular Co., supra.
4. Seller Remedies under the U.C.C. U.C.C. remedies 
for breach, although consistent with the common law, are very 
broad. In the current gas market, where there exists an over- 
deliverability of natural gas and depressed prices, the terms of 
natural gas sale/purchase contracts are not being honored. In 
such situations reluctant buyers may force sellers to look to 
their U.C.C. remedies. Buyers have a similar broad range of 
remedies, but they are beyond the scope of this outline. For 
buyer remedies readers should consult §2-711-2-717. See e .g. 
Pioneer Hi Bred Corn Co. of Ill. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 16 
Ill. App. 3d, 306 N.E.2d 357 (1977) (applies the cover remedy of 
§2-712).
§2-703 provides that upon buyer’s breach of contract the 
seller may: (i) withhold or stop delivery of such goods,
(ii) resell and recover damages as provided in §2-706,
(iii) recover damages for nonacceptance (or in a proper case, the 
price); and (iv) cancel. Remedies for nonpayment however, apply 
only where payment is "due on or before delivery". §2-703. Take 
or pay provisions are one common form of prepayment found in many 
gas contracts, which may invoke these remedies.
Generally the U.C.C. will not allow the seller to recover 
the full purchase price from the buyer for breach of a natural 
gas contract. In most instances, oil and gas remains in the 
formation. Under §2-706(1), if goods (such as unextracted oil 
and gas) are retained by the seller and resold the measure of 
damages is the difference between the contract price and the 
price of resale. Where such goods are not resold after 
repudiation by the buyer, the seller's measure of damages is the 
contract price less the market price at the time and place for 
tender. §2-708(1). Certain procedural safeguards also restrict 
the manner of resale. For example such goods must be sold "in
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good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner." §2-706(1). 
Where the resale is a private sale, the seller must give the 
buyer reasonable notification of seller's intention to resell the 
oil and gas to another party. §2-706(3). If the seller profits 
from such resale, however, the seller is not accountable for such 
profit. §2-706(6).
In general, sellers may sue for the contract price only if 
the goods are lost or damaged, which usually does not occur to 
unextracted natural oil and gas. Further, an action for contract 
price is applicable only if the goods are "identified to the 
contract." In Piney Woods Country Life School v. Shell Oil 
Company, 726 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1984), the court stated that "gas 
underground is future goods; no particular gas is sold until it 
is identified — i.e., brought to the surface." As such, natural 
gas which has not been produced is not "identified to the 
contract," and therefore the remedy of contract price was not 
available. Further, §2-709 (1) (b) allows the recovery of the 
contract price only if "the seller is unable after reasonable 
effort to resell them at a reasonable price or the circumstances 
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing." In 
today's current market, it is unlikely that the seller would be 
able to meet this test although at a very reduced price.
Additionally, the seller should note that the U.C.C. 
contains specific references to the mitigation of damages and 
reasonableness. Comment 1 to §1-106 states that the U.C.C. 
"makes it clear that damages must be minimized." Common law 
mitigation principles arguably also supplement the U.C.C. 
through §1-103.
5. Defenses as to Breach of Contract. Most
commentators note that U.C.C. defenses are not unique to the 
U.C.C. and merely incorporate traditional common law remedies and 
concepts. Hillman, McDonnell and Nickles, "Common Law and Equity 
under the U.C.C." (1985 ed.). As sellers have recently invoked
U.C.C. remedies, buyers have tried to rely on these defenses.
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Following is a brief outline of two of the more important 
defenses.
a. Unconscionability. Section 2-302 provides 
that if a court "as a matter of law finds the contract . . . 
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to 
enforce the contract. . . . "  Unconscionability does not mean 
that a court will refuse to uphold a bad bargain. The underlying 
reason for a court’s refusal to enforce unconscionable contracts 
is the principle of preventing unfair surprise, not to reallocate 
the risk due to the superior bargaining power of one party. 
Fargo Machine and Tool Co. v. Kearney and Trucker Corp., 428 F. 
Supp. 364, 381 (E.D. Mich. 1977). Thus the basic test of 
unconscionability is "whether, in light of the general commercial 
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or 
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be 
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the making of the contract." Comment 1 to §2-302. 
Unconscionability is almost always raised in recent take-or-pay 
litigation. Madina, McKinsey and Daniel, "Take or Litigate: 
Enforcing the Plain Meaning of the Take-Or-Pay Clause in Natural 
Gas Contracts", 40 Ark. L. Rev. 185, 228-232 (1987) (hereinafter 
referred to as "Madina, McKinsey and Daniel").
b. Impracticability. §2-615 codifies the common 
law concepts of impossibility and frustration in a commercial 
impracticability defense. §2-615(a) provides that "delaying 
delivery. . by seller. . . is not a breach of his duty under the 
contract per se unless performance as agreed has been made 
impracticable by the occurrence of the contingency the non- 
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract 
was made. . . ." Although the U.C.C. speaks of this defense as 
being available to sellers it has been extended to buyers of gas 
as well. International Metals and Chemical Corp. v. Llano, Inc. 
770 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1985) Courts strictly construe the 
doctrine of impracticability and a showing of mere 
unprofitability or increased costs is not sufficient to relieve
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See Comment 4 of §2-615 and Easternthe contracting party.
Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Florida
1975). Although this defense is available to purchasers of 
natural gas, it has met only limited success to date. Madina, 
McKinsey and Daniel at 232-239.
6. Good Faith. Before leaving the Article 2
discussion, it is important to note the U.C.C.'s imposition of a
standard of good faith under all U.C.C. contracts and
transactions. §1-203. Generally, the U.C.C. term "good faith" 
only means "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." §1-201(19). Arguments have been made concerning how 
stringent of a standard this is, which to a great extent center 
around whether "honesty in fact" is an objective or subjective 
standard. See Hardin, "Equitable and Good Faith Limitations on 
the Enforcement of Acceleration Clauses" 57 Okla. B.J. 1841
(1986) . As previously observed, however, in the case of Article 
2 transactions involving merchants, §2-103(b) imposes a higher 
objective standard of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing. When combined with the fact that many courts recognize 
an affirmative cause of action for breach of the duty of good 
faith, this objective standard can become very meaningful to 
litigants. Although oil and gas law has in certain instances 
imposed a common law standard of good faith, the standard is not 
so high or exact as that of Article 2. Kuntz §§ 474 (in 
commencement of a well) and 48.3 (pooling). For numerous cases 
dealing with the issue of good faith affirmative actions and 
defenses see "Lender Liability Litigation", PLI Pub. #A4-4202
(1987) .
IV. Impact of Article 9 on Oil and Gas Leases.
It has been noted that oil and gas financing is "a strange 
world of its own." Woodward v. Wright 266 F.2d 108, 115 (10th
Cir. 1959). As previously discussed, Article 9 usually suggests 
that the law of real estate mortgages should govern mineral
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interests prior to extraction. However, like many generalities, 
it is wise to consider some possible exceptions to the rule.
A. Direct Applicability of Article 9 to Oil and Gas 
Leases.
1. Oil and Gas Leases Themselves as Article 9 
Personal Property. As noted in Sections II (C) and (D) of this
outline, derivative interests created under oil and gas leases 
may sometimes be considered as personal property by applicable 
state law. Although Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas appear to treat 
oil and gas interests as real property not subject to Article 9, 
there are at least two arguments available which may create 
uncertainty by indicating applicability of Article 9 in some 
instances.
a . Derivative Interests as Interests in Personal 
Property. Section II(D) of this outline suggests that production 
payments, net profits interests and other derivative oil and gas 
leasehold interests which might be created from time-to-time, are 
sometimes personal property for the purposes of state law. As 
such, they are clearly within the scope of §9-102(1)(a) and most 
likely should be treated as general intangibles under §9-106.
b . Treating the Lease Itself as Being Subject to 
Article 9. In Citicorp v. Fremont National Bank, 738 P .2d 29 
(Colo. App. 1987), the debtor assigned the secured party the 
right to receive the proceeds of an installment loan sale 
contract, giving the secured party possession of the sale 
contract documents. The Court found that Article 9 applied to 
the collateral assignment, describing the land sale contract as 
"realty paper" which was itself personal property subject to the 
U.C.C. Notwithstanding §9-104 (j) which states that Article 9 
does not apply to the creation of an interest in real estate, 
Comment 4 to §9-102(3) supports the Colorado Court's conclusion, 
giving the following example:
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The owner of Blackacre borrows $10,000. . . . and 
secures his note by a mortgage on Blackacre. (Article 
9) is not applicable to the creation of the real estate 
mortgage. However, when the mortgagee in turn pledges 
this note and mortgage to secure his own obligation to 
X, (Article 9) is applicable to the security interest 
thus created in the note and the mortgage.
The example is directly on point to the facts in Citicorp and few 
would argue with the Court's result. But the example and its use 
in Citicorp casts doubt on whether Article 9 directly applies to 
oil and gas leases.
Oil and gas leases create rights to receive an income 
stream similar to that created by the Citicorp installment land 
sale contract. Oil and gas leases are themselves pieces of paper 
which are personal property. Oil and gas leases relate to 
property that will be treated as personal property from the 
moment of extraction. Finally, as seen before in this outline, 
many courts (particularly Oklahoma) already treat oil and gas 
leases as personal property for certain purposes, even before 
extraction. These similarities certainly imply that Article 9 
should cover rights granted in oil and gas leases. While it is 
possible that a court will apply Citicorp by distinguishing 
between the lease itself (excluded from Article 9 by §9-104[5]) 
and a security interest in the rights under the lease (Comment 4 
to § 9-102) , certain distinctions between the nature of oil and 
gas leases and land sale contracts and the historical treatment 
of oil and gas leases make this result unlikely.
Unlike Citicorp's land sale contract, §9-104(j)
expressly excludes "interests in. . . . real estate, including a
lease. . . . thereunder." Second, as noted in a recent
commentary on Citicorp, a land sale contract is subject to the 
traditional common law doctrine of equitable conversion which 
converts the seller's interest into personal property. Harrell 
and Dancy, "Oil and Gas Financing Under Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9", Okla. L. Rev. _____ (to be published in 1988). This
is not true of oil and gas leases. Finally, and perhaps most
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importantly, courts in Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas have all held 
that mortgages on oil and gas leases are subject to real estate 
mortgage filing and attestation rules. See Sections I (C)(1)-(3) 
of this outline supra. It will be very difficult to change that 
historic approach. See also Ingram v. Ingram, 521 P.2d 254 (Kan. 
1974) which holds that an oil and gas lease pledged as collateral 
is not personal property subject to Article 9. This case is 
particularly relevant to Oklahoma because Kansas, like Oklahoma, 
generally considers an oil and gas lease as "profit a pendre" or 
"incorporeal hereditament."
c. Oil and Gas Leases as Security Devices. If 
an oil and gas lease (or derivative interest such as a production 
payment) is intended to secure payment of a note, then the lease 
itself may be deemed a mortgage, regardless of its form. See 
e.g. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 392 P.2d 265 (Cal. 1964). As 
such, the note and lease/mortgage would be subject to Article 9. 
§§9-304, 9-305, 9-308 and 9-309. In such a situation, Citicorp's 
reasoning clearly applies.
d. Precautions. Because of the preceding 
discussion, the author believes that creditors using oil and gas 
interests as collateral security should make a double filing as a 
mortgage and under a U.C.C. financing statement (central filing). 
This practice does no harm and is prudent given the uncertainties 
in this area.
e. Second Level Security Interests. The 
previous discussion should not mislead the reader concerning 
second level security interests. For example, the partnership 
interest of a person in an oil and gas limited partnership 
program is an Article 9 general intangible. Comment 4 to Section 
9-102 (3).
2. Interests in Extracted Oil and Gas. Once 
extracted, there is no doubt that oil and gas are considered 
personal property subject to Article 9. Continental Supply Co. 
v. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1945) and §9-105 (1) (h) .
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Generally, immediately upon extraction minerals become inventory 
under §9-109(4), since they are held by a person who "holds them 
for sale." Section 1-201(9) (amended in 1972) makes it clear 
that working interest owners who are selling their oil and gas 
fit within the category of a "person who holds for sale" by 
stating that "all persons who sell minerals or the like 
(including oil and gas) at wellhead. . . shall be deemed to be 
persons in the business of selling goods of that kind." As 
inventory, a security interest must be perfected in accordance 
with §§9-401(1) (place of filing), 9-103 (choice of applicable 
law) and 9-402. (Note, that Oklahoma and Texas have non-uniform 
amendments).
After becoming inventory, the extracted oil and gas again 
changes form when sold. Gas sold into a pipeline subject to a 
contract instantaneously becomes "accounts" under §9-106 as a 
right to payment for goods sold. In turn, these accounts will 
ripen into identifiable cash proceeds in the form of checks drawn 
by the pipeline purchaser as determined by division orders. This 
same reasoning is not as true for crude oil since division orders 
do not create legal enforceable obligations of the purchaser to 
buy.
B . Choice of Law and Filing.
It is beyond the scope of this outline to discuss the 
numerous issues and questions which arise in connection with 
these Article 9 filings. However, the reader should be aware of 
the U.C.C.’s choice of law provisions. Under §9-103(5)
"perfection and the effect of perfection or nonperfection of a 
security interest which is created by a debtor who has an 
interest in minerals or the like (including oil and gas) before 
extraction and which attaches thereto as extracted, or which 
attaches to an account resulting from a sale thereof at the 
wellhead or minehead are governed by the law (including conflict 
of laws rules) of the jurisdiction wherein the wellhead or 
minehead is located." Thus, as oil and gas is extracted the
-32-
perfection rules which govern that oil and gas are based on the 
location of the wellhead. Where the gas ultimately is sold is 
not relevant. Arkansas, Oklahoma and Texas have adopted this 
provision.
V. Conclusion. Traditionally, courts have not applied the 
provisions of U.C.C. Articles 2 and 9 directly to oil and gas 
leases or even their derivative interests. No question exists, 
that these articles control important related contracts, such as 
oil and gas purchase/sale agreements. Article 2's more lenient 
contract formation and interpretation rules and liberal remedies, 
however, mean that imaginative attorneys will search for ways to 
impose the U.C.C. directly or by analogy onto oil and gas lease 
transactions. Similarly, debtor/creditor lawyers looking for 
ways to challenge the priority of oil and gas mortgages may argue 
Article 9's direct applicability to oil and gas leases and their 
derivative interests. This area of the law is relatively 
undeveloped but may see more activity because of (i) the 
attractive features of the U.C.C., (2) inherent uncertainties 
raised by oil and gas law and (3) economic/litigation pressures 
in oil and gas states.
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